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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 44960 
     ) 
vs.     ) Twin Falls County No. CR42-2015-11025 
     ) 
ALEX JAMES CHAPPELL,  ) RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
     ) 




 Has Chappell failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when 
it sentenced him to 15 years with three years determinate upon his conviction for possession of 





Chappell Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
A. Introduction 
 Police found two large and three small clear plastic bags containing marijuana, a small 
scale, a large hunting knife and six clean baggies in Alex James Chappell’s school backpack.  
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(Conf. Exhibits, p. 4.)  Chappell was, at the time, on juvenile probation for petit theft and 
resisting and obstructing an officer.  (Conf. Exhibits, pp. 4, 8.)  The amount of marijuana in 
Chappell’s possession, 108.8 grams or about 3.83 ounces, was about 17 times as much as officers 
would expect if it were merely for personal use.   (Conf. Exhibits, p. 5.)  Circumstances 
suggested Chappell had been dealing marijuana for a while, and he admitted he had been selling 
for about two years.  (Conf. Exhibits, pp. 4, 6.)    Chappell stated he did not use marijuana, but 
sold it to make money.    (Conf. Exhibits, p. 6.)   
The state charged Chappell with one count of possession of marijuana with intent to 
deliver.  (R., pp. 88-89.)  As part of a plea agreement that involved the state dismissing pending 
juvenile charges and making specific sentencing recommendations, Chappell pled guilty.  (R., 
pp. 94, 98-108.)  The district court imposed and executed a sentence of five years with two years 
determinate, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp. 159-63.) 
 On appeal, Chappell argues the district court “should have suspended execution of his 
sentence and placed him on probation in light of the mitigating factors, including his young age, 
troubled childhood and family support.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)  Review of the record, 
however, shows this argument to lack merit.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering 
the defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) 
(citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 
Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the 
defendant's probable term of confinement.  Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 
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552 (1999)).  Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of 
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  Whether to retain 
jurisdiction is a question left to the court's discretion, as is the decision to grant probation.  State 
v. Hernandez, 122 Idaho 227, 230, 832 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Ct. App. 1992). 
 
C. Chappell Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion 
 
 To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish 
that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive.  State v. Farwell, 144 
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).  To establish that the sentence was excessive, he must 
demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to 
accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.  
Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401.  In determining whether the appellant met his burden, 
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release him on parole is 
exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be 
the period of actual incarceration.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 
 The factors relevant to the court’s discretion in ordering execution of the sentence or 
probation are set forth by statute as follows: 
(1) The court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime without 
imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and 
circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the 
defendant, it is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of 
the public because: 
 
(a) There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or 
probation the defendant will commit another crime; or 
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(b) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided 
most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or 
 
(c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's 
crime; or 
 
(d) Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to the 
defendant; or 
 
(e) Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons in 
the community; or 
 
(f) The defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminal. 
 
(2) The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the court, shall 
be accorded weight in favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment: 
 
(a) The defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened harm; 
 
(b) The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would 
cause or threaten harm; 
 
(c) The defendant acted under a strong provocation; 
 
(d) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the 
defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense; 
 
(e) The victim of the defendant's criminal conduct induced or facilitated 
the commission of the crime; 
 
(f) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his 
criminal conduct for the damage or injury that was sustained; provided, 
however, nothing in this section shall prevent the appropriate use of 
imprisonment and restitution in combination; 
 
(g) The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity 
or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the 
commission of the present crime; 
 
(h) The defendant's criminal conduct was the result of circumstances 
unlikely to recur; 
 
(i) The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that the 
commission of another crime is unlikely. 
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I.C. § 19-2521.  “The purpose of the retained jurisdiction procedure is to provide a period for 
evaluation of the offender's potential for rehabilitation and suitability for probation.”  Bradford v. 
State, 124 Idaho 788, 790, 864 P.2d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 1993). 
 At sentencing the district court expressed several of its sentencing concerns about 
Chappell consistent with the applicable legal standards.  (6/13/16 Tr., p. 13, L. 19 – p. 17, L. 9.)  
First, it was concerned about Chappell’s lack of remorse.  (6/13/16 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 5-14.)  Second, 
the court was concerned that Chappell’s criminality was the result of conscious intelligent 
choice, rather than impulse or addiction.  (6/13/16 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 15-25.)  Responding to a 
defense argument (6/13/16 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 17-22), the court stated it was “very sensitive to the fact 
that a person of [Chappell’s] age has the potential to not fare well in the Idaho State 
Penitentiary,” but that the juvenile system had thus far amounted to an ineffectual “slap on the 
wrist” (6/13/16 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 1-6).  The district court imposed a sentence of five years with two 
years determinate and retained jurisdiction for 365 days.  (6/13/16 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 7-12.)  In 
conclusion, the district judge stated:  
I think that you have got to make some significant mental changes in your life, 
and I think this program is the best I can offer you. I think if I put you back on 
probation today, it would just be a question of time before you relapsed and got 
back in trouble again. I'm not going do it. It's time that you faced the consequences 
for the decisions that you made. 
 
(6/13/16 Tr., p. 17, Ls. 3-9.) 
   The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding it needed a period to 
evaluate Chappell’s potential for rehabilitation and suitability for probation.  Its specific concerns 
about Chappell’s rehabilitation potential (6/13/16 Tr., p. 13, L. 19 – p. 17, L. 9), supported by 
Chappell’s extensive record of juvenile offenses (Conf. Exhibits, pp. 6-10), the fact he was 
selling marijuana for about two years as a business rather than to feed any personal addiction 
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(Conf. Exhibits, pp. 4, 6), and the fact he was on juvenile probation when he committed the 
instant crime (Conf. Exhibits, pp. 4, 8, 10), show the district court made a reasonable decision 
based on the applicable law and facts. 
 Chappell argues the district court abused its sentencing discretion by “imposing an 
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts” and “should have suspended 
execution of his sentence and placed him on probation in light of the mitigating factors, including 
his young age, troubled childhood, and family support.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)  The “mitigating 
factors” cited by Chappell are: (1) he “grew up in an unstable environment” (Appellant’s brief, p. 
5); (2) he has “struggled greatly to cope with his father’s death,” which caused him to be 
diagnosed with depression which was treated with medication and caused “positive aspects of his 
life” to fall “to the wayside” to be replaced with alcohol and drug use and, ultimately, criminal 
behavior (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6 (internal quotations omitted)); (3) he professed a desire to 
change and a plan for his future (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-7); and (4) he “had great support from 
his family” (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8).  These claimed “factors” do not show an abuse of 
discretion. 
First, the “factors” relied on by Chappell do not show that the sentence of five years with 
two years determinate for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver is excessive.  The 
evidence Chappell claims supports his “factors” was before the district court.  The district court 
did not abuse its discretion by reaching different conclusions than Chappell about the 
significance or weight of this evidence.   
Second, the “factors” have little, if any, relevance to the decision whether to grant 
probation or to retain jurisdiction.  Chappell does not contend that the district court did not find 
facts sufficient to impose the sentence but retain jurisdiction, see I.C. § 19-2521(1), and the --
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“factors” he advocates are not “grounds” that “shall be accorded weight in favor of avoiding a 
sentence of imprisonment.”  I.C. § 19-2521(2).  Even accepting the “factors” as true and 
deserving of weight does not show that the district court abused its discretion in concluding it 
needed a better “evaluation of [Chappell]'s potential for rehabilitation and suitability for 
probation.”  Bradford, 124 Idaho at 790, 864 P.2d at 628.   
Chappell’s record and the facts of the crime justify the district court’s sentence of five 
years with two years determinate and retained jurisdiction.  Chappell has failed to show an abuse 
of sentencing discretion. 
 
II. 




 Shortly after Chappell’s placement on retained jurisdiction, the Idaho Department of 
Correction recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction.  (Conf. Exhibits, p. 73.)  
The recommendation was based primarily upon Chappell engaging in “major rule violations,” 
specifically getting a face tattoo while at the facility and use of drugs (NO2 cartridges used as 
inhalants).  (Conf. Exhibits, pp. 75-76.)  Chappell “was removed from the facility abruptly due to 
his involvement in drug use and lack of cooperation with the investigation into that matter.”  
(Conf. Exhibits, p. 76.)  The report concluded: 
In the short time Mr. Chappell was at this facility he received two Class B DORs. 
The second of these DORs was for using N02 as an inhalant, which is a behavior 
Mr. Chappell has received criminal charges for in the past. He has not taken full 
advantage of this opportunity to turn his life in a different direction. He has not 
demonstrated that he is willing to move away from his criminal and addictive 
behavior. Due to his behavior at this facility, he was unable to continue his 




(Conf. Exhibits, p. 78.)  Based on the report, the district court relinquished jurisdiction.  (R., pp. 
169-71.) 
 Chappell thereafter filed a Rule 35 motion “for reconsideration of the relinquishment of 
jurisdiction.”  (R., p. 180.)  The motion attached reports allegedly showing “the disciplinary 
actions against Defendant regarding both the tattoo and the inhalant were actually dismissed.”  
(R., pp. 180, 182-83.)  The district court ordered an evidentiary hearing.  (R., pp. 193-94.)  After 
hearing the evidence presented (2/17/17 Tr., p. 22, L. 5 – p. 68, L. 19), the district court 
concluded the issue before it for decision was whether to “continue with the with the 
relinquishment” or put Chappell on probation (2/17/17 Tr., p. 79, Ls. 8-11).  The district court 
ultimately denied the motion.  (R., pp. 220-23).  The district court found that in subsequent 
hearings at IDOC related to the first two DORs “Chappell admitted to the tattoo-related DOR but 
the drug-related DOR was dismissed.”  (R., p. 221.)  The district court further found that after 
filing the Rule 35 motion Chappell “got a second tattoo, for which he received a second DOR.”  
(Id.)  The district court denied the motion, in large part because “the new DOR convinces the 
Court that its decision was the appropriate one.”  (R., pp. 222-23.)   
 On appeal Chappell, citing State v. Flores, 162 Idaho 298, ___, 396 P.3d 1180, 1183-84 
(2017), acknowledges that reinstating the court’s retained then relinquished jurisdiction was 
beyond the scope of a proper Rule 35 motion.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)  He argues, however, 
the district court abused its discretion by not granting the motion by suspending execution of the 
sentence and placing him on probation.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-12.)  Even assuming that 
ordering probation was within the scope of his motion, Chappell has failed to show an abuse of 
discretion.   
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B. Standard Of Review 
 
 A motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and the Court 
reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 
203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).  “In conducting our review of the grant or denial of a Rule 35 
motion, we consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used for determining the 
reasonableness of the original sentence.”  State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903, 341 P.3d 1269, 
1272 (Ct. App. 2014). 
 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Chappell’s Rule 35 Motion 
 
 A motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, 
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.  State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 
23, 24 (2006). To prevail on a Rule 35 motion, a defendant must show that the sentence is 
excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in 
support of the motion.  State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 484-85, 272 P.3d 417, 456-57 (2012); 
Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840.   
 The district court summarized the new evidence presented after sentencing as including 
an APSI that “documented two disciplinary offense reports (DORs) the defendant received: one 
for a tattoo-related incident, and one for a drug-related incident” and also “documented some 
progress the defendant made during the rider,” and evidence presented directly in support of the 
motion showing “dismissal of the drug-related DOR” but the issuance of a new DOR for another 
tattoo.  (R., pp. 22-21.)  Relying primarily upon the fact of a new DOR for a new tattoo (a 
behavior for which Chappell had been disciplined before), the district court “in its discretion” 
denied the motion.  (R., pp. 222-23.)  The court specifically rejected the argument that the new 
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tattoo DOR was merely the product of “unwise or impulsive” decision-making, but instead 
evidenced “deep-seated criminal thinking” and that Chappell had “still not learned respect for 
rules” and was “therefore ill-equipped for probation.”  (R., p. 222.)  Because the district court 
correctly applied the law to its factual findings, it did not abuse its discretion. 
 On appeal Chappell argues “the new tattoo DOR does not prove that he will be 
unsuccessful on probation” and that he correctly argued that the act was impulsive and the 
district court incorrectly found that it was indicative of criminal thinking and lack of respect for 
the rules.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)  Chappell has shown neither clear error in the district court’s 
factual findings nor that the inferences drawn from those facts were unreasonable.  See State v. 
Jensen, 137 Idaho 240, 246, 46 P.3d 536, 542 (Ct. App. 2002) (“Moreover, the credibility of 
witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from 
the evidence were all matters within the province of the district court.”).  He has therefore failed 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court and 
the order denying the Rule 35 motion. 




      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen___________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of August, 2017 I served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by causing a copy addressed to: 
 
 JENNY C. SWINFORD 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
  





      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen___________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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